Hofstra Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 3

Article 8

1997

Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the
Mailbox Rule
Paul Fasciano

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Fasciano, Paul (1997) "Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the Mailbox Rule," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 25: Iss. 3, Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/8

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Fasciano: Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the Mailbox Rule

NOTE
INTERNET ELECTRONIC MAIL: A LAST
BASTION FOR THE MAILBOX RULE
CONTENTS

II.

INTRODUCTION ...............................

972

THE MAILBOX RULE ..............................

974
974
975

A. Effective ime of Acceptance-Dispatch or Receipt? ..
B. Face-to-FaceCommunication-ReceiptRequired ....
C. Communication by Post and the Birth of the
Mailbox Rule-Mere Dispatch Required ..........
D. "SubstantiallyInstantaneous Two-Way" Forms of
Communication-Treatas Face-to-Face ..........
E. The Demise of the Mailbox Rule? ...............

976
983
986

III. INTERNET ELECTRONIC MAIL .......................
A. Introduction ..............................
B. Advantages and Disadvantages ................
C. Viability .................................
D. A ProperMedium for Transmitting an Acceptance? ..
E. Nature ofDispatch .........................
F Nature of Receipt ..........................
IV.

IS INTERNET ELECTRONIC MAIL A "SUBSTANTIALLY

INSTANTANEOUS TWO-WAY" FORM OF COMMUNICATION?

V.

987
987
990
993
993
995
996

.

999

A. Substantially Instantaneous? ..................
B. Two-Way? ...............................

999
1001

CONCLUSION ...................................

1003

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:971

The [mailbox] rule has no application to substantially instantaneous

means of communication, such as the telephone, telex, and electronic
mail; the increasinguse ofsuch means has undoubtedly diminished the
practical importance of the rule.
-Professor E. Allan Farnsworth'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Is the mailbox rule2 dying? A review of recent literature, a sample
of which is provided above, suggests that this might be the case. The
mailbox rule, a chestnut rule of contract law, holds that an acceptance to
an offer is effective upon dispatch by the offeree (for instance, by placing
a letter in a mailbox), rather than upon receipt by the offeror, regardless
of whether it is ever received by the offeror, and regardless of whether
the offeree receives a revocation from the offeror while the acceptance
is in transit.3 Although the mailbox rule has enjoyed unanimous
application by common law jurisdictions in the context of the post,4
some have theorized that it may be facing obsolescence as the post gives
way to more modem methods of communication that are better suited to
the receipt rule.5
What makes many modem methods of communication better suited
to the receipt rule than to the mailbox rule is their "substantially
instantaneous two-way" nature.6 These qualities make them more
analogous to face-to-face communication than to correspondence by post,
thus dictating that they be governed by the same rule as face-to-face

1. E. ALLAN FARNswoRTH, CONTRACTS § 3.22, at 182 (2d ed. 1990).
2. The term "dispatch rule" is used interchangeably with 'Yailbox rule" throughout this Note.
3. The drafters of the Restatement articulate the rule as follows: "Unless the offer provides
otherwise, (a) an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and
completes the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without
regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COTRACTS § 63 (1981).
4. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part H.E.
6. "Substantially instantaneous" and "two-way" are the terms of art used by the Restatement
to describe the two qualities that a method of communication must possess in order to justify
dispensing with the mailbox rule in its context. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 64.
The terms "substantially instantaneous" and "instantaneous" are used interchangeably throughout this
Note and describe a length of time not exceeding a few seconds. A "two-way" method of
communication is one in which interaction among the communicating parties is possible, allowing
each to ensure that the other has clearly understood the messages conveyed. See infra text
accompanying note 48. Synonymous terms include simultaneous, synchronous, and interactive.
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communication with respect to the effective time of an acceptance-the
receipt rule.
This theory about the demise of the mailbox rule has some merit in
that many methods of communication have come into widespread usage
that are indeed better suited to the receipt rule--examples include the
telephone and electronic data interchange. 7 This Note posits, however,
that there exists a very viable, but somewhat overlooked and misunderstood, modem method of communication which is actually better suited
to the mailbox rule--Interet electronic mail, or as more commonly
called, Internet "e-mail." 8
Part II of this Note presents the mailbox rule and the controversy as
to whether dispatch or receipt of acceptances should be required for
contract formation. Whereas receipt of acceptances is generally required
in the context of face-to-face communication, mere dispatch is required
in the context of the post. Regarding other methods of communication,
the Restatement rule is presented which dictates that substantially
instantaneous two-way methods of communication receive the same
treatment as face-to-face communication with respect to the effective
time of an acceptance. The rule is then explored through its application
to the telephone, electronic data interchange, and the facsimile.
The focus of the Note then shifts to Internet e-mail and its
suitability to the mailbox rule. Part m provides a brief introduction to
Internet e-mail, offers some of its advantages and disadvantages as
compared to other forms of communication, and relates some figures
which illuminate the extent to which it is utilized. Part III also addresses
the threshold issue of whether Internet e-mail is a legally acceptable
medium for transmitting an acceptance, and also examines the nature of
dispatch and receipt of Internet e-mail messages.
Part IV examines the transmission of an Internet e-mail message and
posits that Internet e-mail is neither substantially instantaneous, nor twoway. Accordingly, Part V concludes that the emerging trend to discard
the mailbox rule in the context of substantially instantaneous two-way
methods of communication should not be applied to Internet e-mail.
Rather, acceptances transmitted via Internet e-mail should receive the

7. For a description of electronic data interchange, and a discussion of how it is better suited
to the receipt rule, see infra text accompanying notes 52-54.

8. For convenience, the simple term "e-mail" is used throughout this Note to refer to Interet
e-mail, as opposed to intrasystem e-mail, although in some instances the distinction is irrelevant.
Where the distinction is particularly relevant, Internet e-mail and intrasystem e-mail are referred to
as such. See infra Part I.A for a description of these two types of e-mail transmissions.
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same treatment as postal acceptances, and should be effective upon
dispatch.

II. THE MAILBOX RULE
A.

Effective ime of Acceptance-Dispatch or Receipt?

Generally speaking, a contract is a promise made between two
entities that the law will enforce. 9 A promise is usually brought into
fruition through the process of offer and acceptance: an offeror makes an
offer to an offeree, who subsequently accepts the offer." Acceptance by
the offeree is the last step in contract formation-it creates obligations
where they did not previously exist. The acceptance itself, therefore, has
been the subject of much discussion and controversy.
One aspect of the acceptance that deserves special scrutiny is its
timing. Assuming that the content of the acceptance is satisfactory, at
what point in time does it become effective? When does that magic
moment arise where two entities become legally bound to conduct certain
affairs in a particular manner? Since dispatch of the acceptance by the
offeree is distinct from receipt of the acceptance by the offeror, a
controversy is created as to which of these two events should denote the
formation of a contract."

9. "A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1.
10. "An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it." Id.

§ 24.
11. One author has identified 11 situations which are analytically distinct in determining
whether dispatch or receipt should form a contract. See Ian RL Macneil, Time of Acceptance: Too
Many Problemsfor a Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 947, 947.48 & n.l (1964). For instance, in
one scenario an offeree dispatches an acceptance and subsequently receives a revocation from the
offeror before the offerer receives the acceptance. A different scenario is presented where the offerce
dispatches an acceptance which is never received by the offeror. As the title of his work suggests,
Macneil proposes that neither the mailbox rule nor the receipt rule can deal appropriately with all
11 situations. See id. at 978.
For purposes of this Note, it is unnecessary to distinguish between the various scenarios in
which the mailbox rule may be applied. In the context of the post, the significant time lapse between
dispatch and receipt requires that a choice be made between the two as to which will form a
contract; according to Macneil, this choice is made by examining the peculiarities of each scenario.
This Note, on the other hand, addresses the proposition that in the context of substantially
instantaneous two-way methods of communication, receipt of an acceptance can be promptly
ascertained by the offeree, and thus receipt is always preferable to dispatch, regardless of the
peculiarities of each scenario.
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Intuitively, receipt of the acceptance should be required for contract
formation. The acceptance is a communication, and a communication, by
its very nature, must be heard and understood; in other words, it must be
received. After all, it is only after receipt of the acceptance that both
parties become aware of their mutual agreement. Contract formation by
mere dispatch disturbs one's common sense-it smacks of unfairness to
the offeror, who remains unaware of the contract until the acceptance is
received, if ever. In line with this notion that communications must be
received is the fact that offers," revocations," and rejections" are
effective only when received.
B. Face-to-FaceCommunication-ReceiptRequired
Indeed, in the context of the simplest form of communication, faceto-face correspondence, the law follows the intuitive preference described
above, and a contract is formed only upon actual receipt of the acceptance by the offeror1 5 At first glance, one might not see "dispatch" of
the acceptance--the words being spoken by the offeree-as being distinct
from "receipt" of the acceptance-the words being heard and understood
by the offeror-but various complications bring out the distinction. For
example, the offeree may utter the acceptance in a low tone of voice, or
a loud airplane may pass overhead while the acceptance is leaving the
offeree's mouth, such that it is not heard by the offeror. In such cases,
a contract has not been formed-though the offeree has dispatched an
acceptance, it has not been received by the offeror.
It is critical to note that there is no reason to depart from the
intuitive preference for receipt of acceptances in the context of face-toface correspondence. More specifically, it is simply not a burden for the
offeree to ensure receipt in a timely fashion, so there should be a requirement to do so. The offeree is in the presence of the offeror, and may

12. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.10, at 137 ("An offer is not effective until it
reaches the offeree.").

13. See, e.g., id. § 3.17, at 162 ("The revocation is not effective... until it is received by the
offeree."). A few jurisdictions give effect to revocations upon dispatch. See, e.g., 2 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:41, at 443 (4th ed.
1991).

14. See, eg., 2 WILLIsTON & LORD, supra note 13, § 6:41, at 443.
15. See, e.g., 2 id. § 6:34, at 367-71. One caveat is that receipt is not required where

nonreceipt is the fault of the offeror. See id. The Restatement rule incorporates this caveat by
requiring "reasonable diligence" on the part of the offeree in lieu of actual receipt by the offeror,
"since in cases of misunderstanding acceptance turns on what each party knew or had reason to
know." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 56 cmt. b.
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easily seek some sort of indication that the acceptance was heard and
understood. 6 Perhaps the offeror will shake the offeree's hand, express
happiness that a contract has been formed, or begin to discuss the
specifics or preliminaries of the performance of the contract. Indeed, it
would be odd if an offeree were to utter an acceptance, and then receive
no acknowledgment whatsoever from the offeror, verbal or physical, that
the acceptance was heard.
C. Communication by Post and the Birth of the Mailbox Rule-Mere
Dispatch Required
This straightforward analysis is complicated when the contracting
parties are not in the presence of each other, but are at a distance. For the
moment, consider the case where the offeree mails an acceptance to the
offeror. Unlike where the parties are in the presence of each other, the
offeree in this scenario has no ability to ensure that the offeror "heard"
the acceptance. In fact, the offeree has no way of ascertaining when, if
ever, the offeror receives the acceptance. Consequently, the burden of
communication must be placed on one of the parties, meaning that there
will be a period of time during which one of the parties is unaware of
the existence of a contract. If mere dispatch forms a contract, the offeror
will be unaware of the existence of a contract from the time the offeree
dispatches the acceptance until the time the offeror receives it. In the
worst case scenario, the acceptance will never be received, and the
offeror will learn of the contract only upon some further communication
by the offeree. Much damage may have been done by this time. The
offeror may have already breached the contract (having been unaware of
its existence), in which case it may be a summons and complaint that
bring news of the existence of the contract, or the offeror may have
contracted elsewhere, rationally believing that the offeree was uninterested in the offer.
In the alternate scenario, where receipt forms a contract, the offeree
has no way of ascertaining the exact time of contract formation. In the
worst case scenario, a contract is never formed, perhaps because the
acceptance is lost in transit, or because the offeree receives a revocation
before the offeror receives the acceptance. Thus, the offeree must await

16. As the Restatement puts it, "[w]here the parties are in each other's presence, the offeree
can accept without being in doubt as to whether the offeror has attempted to revoke his offer or
whether the offeror has received the acceptance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 64
cmt. a.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/8
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notification from the offeror before performing, preparing for, or relying
on the contract. In the meantime, other opportunities to contract must be
foregone, and certain resources, such as personnel and machinery, must
be kept idle. The offeree's plight may be summarized by a very familiar
observation-time is money. The important point here is that justification
now exists for departing from the intuitive preference for receipt--it is
prejudicial to the offeree because there is no way of ensuring such
receipt.
Faced squarely with this issue in 1818, the King's Bench sided with
the offeree and adopted the dispatch rule, basing its decision on a
rationale of necessity. 7 The court reasoned that the dispatch rule is
necessary for contract formation by post since without it an endless series
of notifications would proceed between the contracting parties."8 In
other words, if we require X to receive Y's acceptance, then Y should
have the right to receive notification from X that the acceptance was
received, and X should have the right to receive notification from Y that
the notification of receipt of the acceptance was received, etc. 9
Common law jurisdictions have followed this decision and have
unanimously adopted the mailbox rule,20 as has the Restatement2 ' and

17. See Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
18. The court stated that notification between the parties "might go on ad infinitum." Id. at
251.
19. As a counterargument, one author has submitted that 'the... dispatch rule is no more
convenient than the [receipt] rule. Under the [receipt] rule, the advantage is merely shifted from the
offeree to the offeror ... " Beth A. Eisler, DefaultRules for ContractFormation by Promise and
the Need for Revision ofthe Mailbox Rule, 79 KY. LJ. 557, 568 (1990-91).
This argument is flawed in three ways. First, under this rationale, the mailbox rule is not,
as the author suggests, a rule of convenience, but is a rule of necessity. Second, the author's
statement is conclusory because it merely states that the dispatch rule is no more convenient than
the receipt rule, but does not state how the dispatch rule is no more convenient. Third, the author
introduces the unrelated concept of "advantage" into the discussion of "convenience."
20. See, e.g., 2 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 13, § 6:32, at 350-54 (listing seminal cases
in various jurisdictions); see also Moseley v. First Community Bank, 649 So. 2d 1274 (Ala. 1994);
Firchau v. Barringer Crater Co., 344 P.2d 486 (Ariz. 1959); Hofer v. Young, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27 (Ct.
App. 1995); Knipple v. Viking Communication, No. 120155, 1994 WL 621872, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Oct. 28, 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 674 A.2d 426 (Conn. 1996); Schenley Indus. v. Curtis,
152 A.2d 300 (Del. 1959); Columbia County Sherifls Office v. Florida Dep't of Law Enforcement,
574 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (includes a thorough discussion of the mailbox rule); Herring v. Dunning, 446 S.E.2d 199 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994); Martin v. GEICO, 565 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Darling v. Nineteen-Eighty
Corp., 176 N.W.2d 765 (Iowa 1970); United States v. Wadlington, 333 S.W.2d 771 (Ky. Ct. App.
1960); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Duckett, 238 A.2d 536 (Md. 1968); Ord, Inc. v. Hoffman, No. CIV.A.898058, 1994 WL 369809, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1994); Birznieks v. Cooper, 275 N.W.2d
221 (Mich. 1979); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Tufle, 435 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Hammond
v. Missouri Property Ins. Placement Facility, 731 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Dalton Buick,
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the UCC.' This is not to say that the rule has created no controversy.
On the contrary, there has been exhaustive debate over its wisdom, which
has produced a dizzying myriad of justifications and criticisms,
arguments and counterarguments. 23 The debate has essentially produced
a stalemate and there now seems to be a consensus that either the
dispatch or receipt rule could be used, but one must be chosen.24
Accordingly, it seems that the mailbox rule has survived not so much
because of its merits, but because the receipt rule has not been demonstrated to be any more desirable. Although an in-depth discussion of this
debate is beyond the scope of this Note, the arguments for and against
the rule are briefly presented to provide a flavor of the controversy.
The mailbox rule faces a number of criticisms.25 First, as described

Oldsmobile, Pontiac, Cadillac, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 189 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1993), rev'don other grounds, 512 N.W.2d 633 (Neb. 1994); Cushing v. Thomson, 386 A.2d
805 (N.H. 1978); 243 S. Harrison St. Corp. v. Ogust, 272 A.2d 578 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1971);
Buchbinder Tunick & Co. v. Manhattan Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 631 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 1995);
Farley v. Champs Fine Foods, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 493 (N.D. 1987); Lewis v. Motorists Ins. Cos., 645
N.E.2d 784 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Woody v. State ex rel. Dep't of Corrections, 833 P.2d 257 (Oka.
1992); Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts v. Grant, 590 A.2d 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Southern
Region Indus. Realty v. Chattanooga Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 612 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1980); Lofton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. 1995); Parks Enters. v. New Century
Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63.
22. See U.C.C. § 1-201(26), (38) (1990).
23. See generally Macneil, supra note 11 (particularly thorough discussion); Morrison v.
Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (same); Eisler, supra note 19 (analyzing the
mailbox rule in the context of modem methods of communication); 2 PIERRE BONASSIES ET AL.,
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 1393-1493
(1968); C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 10-22 (2d ed. 1880); Arthur L.
Corbin, Offer andAcceptance, andSome ofthe ResultingLegal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169,202-04
(1917); Gyula Eorsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formationof Contractsfor the International
Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 317-19 (1979); K. N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of
Contract:Offer andAcceptance,11, 48 YALE LJ. 779,794-95 (1939); ArturNussbaum, Comparative
Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer-and-Acceptance Doctrine,36 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1936); R.
A. Samek, A Reassessment of the Present Rule Relating to PostalAcceptance, 35 AUSm. L.J. 38
(1961); Malcolm P. Sharp, Reflections on Contract,33 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 213-15 (1966); Edward
S. Stimson, Effective Time of an Acceptance, 23 MINN. L. REV. 776 (1939).
24. See I ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3.24,

at 440-41 (rev. ed. 1993).
25. One author has offered a myriad of criticisms of the mailbox rule, which are not discussed
in this Note, in calling for its complete abolishment. See Eisler, supra note 19. These criticisms,
which have been termed "radical," see CORBIN & PEiu.LO, supra note 24, § 3.24, at 442 n.10, are
largely unpersuasive. For instance, the author states that the mailbox rule does not mirror proposed
models of contract formation, see Eisler, supranote 19, at 565, inexplicably overlooking the fact that
the rule is indeed in accord with what are arguably the two most prominent models of contract
formation, the Restatement and the UCC, see supra text accompanying notes 21-22. The author also
criticizes the mailbox rule in that it does not mirror other rules of contract formation, see Eisler,
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above, there exists a span of time under the mailbox rule, the time
between dispatch and receipt, during which only the offeree is aware of
the existence of the contract, thus prejudicing the offeror. The
counterargument to this, of course, is that the receipt rule prejudices the
offeree, who is unable to ascertain the time of receipt of the acceptance
so as to rely on or begin performance of the contract, and who must live
in fear that the contract may be thwarted by revocation before receipt of
the acceptance. 2 6
A second criticism of the mailbox rule is that it is antithetic to the
principle that courts should supply default contract rules in accordance
with what the parties themselves would have decided had they addressed
the issue. In other words, the rule is counterintuitive and belies the
expectations of laypeople.27 This point is corroborated by my personal,
though admittedly sparse survey of laypeople, who almost unanimously
expect that a contract would be formed upon receipt.
Finally, Professors Williston and Langdell have suggested that the
mailbox rule is technically flawed in that the acceptance inherently
requires communication since it is the return promise required to create
a bilateral contract. 28 As described by one author:
The consideration for the offer was the offeree's return promise. But
a promise by its nature is not complete until communicated; a
"promise" into the air is no promise at all. Since there was no promise,
there was no consideration and there could be no contract, until the
letter of acceptance was received andread.The mailbox rule could not
be good law.29

supra note 19, at 565, but she fails to state why it should mirror them.
26. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Eisler, supra note 19, at 558; Marianne M. Jennings, The True Meaning of
Relational Contracts: We Don't Care About the Mailbox Rule, Mirror Images, or Consideration
Anymore-Are We Safe?, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 3, 4 n.7 (1995) (relating an anecdote in which an
offeree, unaware of the mailbox role, fails to realize that a contract has been formed, and contracts
elsewhere).
28. See 2 WILIsToN & LORD, supranote 13, § 6:32, at 362 ("Because the concept of promise
connotes a requirement of communication,... the rule that a bilateral contract is completed by
mailing the acceptance has... been criticized and the contention made that actual communication
should be required.").
A bilateral contract is one in which two parties exchange promises, e.g., Xpromises to give
Y $50, if Ypromises to paint X's house. This is distinguishable from a unilateral contract in which
one party exchanges a promise for the other's performance, e.g., X promises to give Y $50, if Y
actually paintsX's house. See eg., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 45-46. The mailbox rule
invariably contemplates bilateral contracts since the dispatch of the return promise is the subject of
controversy.
29. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell'sOrthodoxy, 45 U. PIT. L. REv. 1,4 (1983) (emphasis added).
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Theoretical and fairness-based counterarguments may be made to
this position. On a theoretical level, it can be argued that communication
of a promise is not inherently required, but that a promise need merely
be declared." For instance, consider the situation in which X, in a room
with the proverbial fifty nuns, accepts an offer made by Y, who is not
present. Indeed, it seems as if a return promise has been made, and that
the parties should be required to uphold their respective promises, despite
the fact that the return promise has not (yet) been communicated to Y.
This is not to say that communication of the acceptance should be
dispensed with, as it is essential to protect the offeror's interests. Rather,
communication to the offeror should be viewed as an afterthought, or a
mere formality created by a limitation of the human mind.3 This
position, which has been offered by Professor Farnsworth, may be
summarized as follows: An acceptance should form a contract upon
manifestation, and receipt by the offeror should be a condition subsequent without which the offeror will not be obliged to perform.3 2
A second counterargument to the position that a promise must be
communicated is that the offeree may be prejudiced by the offeror's
failure to read the acceptance in a timely fashion. Such failure may be
negligent or even intentional in the case of the opportunistic offeror who
has had a change of heart about the contract. The formalistic view that
a promise must be communicated should yield to considerations of
fairness.
Turning to the rationales in favor of the mailbox rule,33 the drafters
of the Restatement assert that it gives the offeree a dependable basis
upon which to form a contract-he need not fear that the contract will4
3
be thwarted by a revocation received while the acceptance is in transit.

30. Dictionary definitions of a promise seem to support the proposition that a promise need
not be communicated, but simply declared. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1213 (6th ed. 1990)
(a promise is "[a] declaration which binds the person who makes it ...to do or forbear a certain
specific act, and which gives to the person to whom made a right to expect or claim the performance
of some particular thing"); THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1059 (rev. ed. 1984) (a
promise is "a declaration or assurance that something specified will or will not happen, be done,
etc.').
31. This limitation being the inability of the human mind to instantaneously transmit thoughts
to the minds of desired recipients.
32. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.14, at 154.
33. These are in addition to the necessity rationale on which the case was originally
established. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. a (1981); see also FARNSWORTH,
supra note 1, § 3.22, at 181 ("allowing the offeror to revoke until the acceptance is received would

aggravate the already vulnerable situation of the offeree, which may have relied, even though unable
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Under this rationale, the privilege of revocation that the common law
extends to offerors-a privilege which is unavailable in many legal
systems---is viewed as an evil or an unfair advantage. It leaves the
offeree standing on a trap door, with the triggering mechanism in the
control of the offeror. The mailbox rule counteracts this advantage by
terminating this unfair power to revoke at the earliest possible time and
upon the occurrence of an event which is fully in the control of the
vulnerable offeree-the dispatch of the acceptance.3 6 This rationale,
however, pertains only to the situation in which the offeree receives a
revocation while the acceptance is in transit. The Restatement acknowledges that the determination as to whether dispatch or receipt should
form a contract is not as easily made where the acceptance is lost or
delayed, and extends the mailbox rule to these situations merely "[i]n the
'
interest of simplicity and clarity."37
Another justification for the mailbox rule is that it is economically
efficient because it allows the offeree to rely on dispatch, and to begin
performance of obligations immediately, as opposed to awaiting notification of receipt of the acceptance by the offeror. As one author has stated:
"[T]he [mailbox] rule... has the merit of closing the deal more quickly
and enabling performance more promptly. It must be remembered that in
the vast majority of cases the acceptance is neither lost nor delayed, and
promptness of action is of importance in all of them."3 8 So, for example, after dispatching an acceptance, a contractor may order supplies for
construction, hire additional personnel, or obtain construction permits-without awaiting notification of receipt of the acceptance by the
offeror.
Justification for the mailbox rule has also been based on the
cornerstone premise of contract law that the offeror is the master of the
offer.39 As the controlling party, the offeror may condition contract
formation on receipt of the acceptance. Failure to include such a

to prove it (for example, if reliance is by inaction)").
35.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. a.

36. See, eg., I CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 24, § 3.24, at 445 ("To balance the common
law's bias toward offerors on the issue of revocation, the common law developed the mailbox rule
which shortens the period in which an offer may be revoked.); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.22,

at 181 ("[The [mailbox] rule curtails the offeror's freedom to revoke by ending it at the earliest
feasible time."); Macneil, supra note 11, at 953 ("[l]t may be said that one of the prime functions

of the dispatch rule is to shorten the duration of the offeror's right to revoke.).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. b.
38. 1 CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 24, § 3.24, at 441.
39. See, eg., Worms v. Burgess, 620 P.2d 455, 457 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
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condition in the offer implies indifference as to the effective time of the

acceptance. The counterargument to this position is that the typical
offeror is unaware of the counterintuitive mailbox rule, and thus has no

reason to deal with it in making an offer.40
Moving to some of the weaker and highly criticized rationales of the
mailbox rule, it has been suggested that because the post office is an
agent of the offeror, the latter constructively receives the acceptance upon

dispatch.41 But this rationale is now almost universally viewed as absurd
since the post office is actually an independent contractor and is no more
an agent of the offeror than of the offeree. 42

Another suspect rationale for the mailbox rule is that dispatch of an
acceptance puts it irrevocably out of the offeree's control.43 As a

preliminary matter, this rationale has been turned on its head since a
letter may now be recalled from the mail.' But more fundamentally, it
is not clear how the ability to withdraw an acceptance addresses the
merits of the rule. Irrespective of this ability, an offeree might nevertheless receive a revocation while the acceptance is in transit, and the
acceptance might nevertheless get lost in transit. This hypertechnical

rationale has been properly dismissed-it is now generally accepted that
the possibility of withdrawal alone is not a sufficient basis for dispensing
with the mailbox rule.45

40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., 1 CORBIN & PERILLO, supranote 24, § 3.24, at 439; FARNSWORTH, supra note
1, § 3.22, at 181; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. a.
42. See, e.g., I CORBIN & PE RLLO, supra note 24, § 3.24, at 439; FARNSWORTH, supra note
1,§ 3.22, at 181 r.4; Macneil, supranote 11, at 958 ('The dispatch rule does not depend on the oftdestroyed agency concept. It has sounder functional foundations... ." (footnote omitted)).
43. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.22, at 181.
44. See, e.g., I CORInN & PERILLO, supra note 24, § 3.26, at 449; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. a; 2 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 13, § 6:38, at 399. This formed the
basis for dispensing with the mailbox rule in two very controversial United States Court of Claims
cases. See Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Dick v. United
States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949). These highly criticized cases have not been followed. See,
e.g., I CORBIN & PERmLO, supranote 24, § 3.26, at 449 ("Such decisions have been rejected outside
of [the Court of Claims].'); Macneil, supra note 11, at 954-55 (suggesting that the court
inappropriately repudiated the dispatch rule, overlooking the functional problem of mistake).
45. See, e.g., Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889, 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (stating that
the change in postal regulations allowing withdrawal of a letter is an insufficient basis upon which
to dispense with the mailbox rule); 2 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 13, § 6:38, at 404 ("[T]he rule
is now firmly developed in the majority of jurisdictions that a contract is formed by a properly
dispatched acceptance, despite the offeree's ability to recall the acceptance.").
This issue is of little relevance in the context of e-mail communications since e-mail
messages which are sent over the Internet, or even within certain systems, cannot be retracted. See,
e.g., E-mail from Julie Bryant, Customer Service Representative, Compuserve (Jan. 25, 1996) (on

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/8

12

Fasciano: Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the Mailbox Rule
MAILBOX RULE AND INTERNET ELECTRONIC MAIL

19971

D.

"SubstantiallyInstantaneous Two-Way" Forms of
Communication-Treatas Face-to-Face

Thus far, two scenarios have been addressed: where acceptances are
transmitted via face-to-face communication, receipt is required, and
where acceptances are transmitted via the post, mere dispatch is required.
But what of acceptances transmitted via other, more modem methods of
communication? Reasoning by analogy, receipt should be required only
if the method of communication in question is more similar to face-toface communication than to the post.
In determining whether a method of communication is more similar
to face-to-face communication than to the post, a mere intuitive analogy
proves unsatisfactory. Rather, a more structured framework for analysis
is required-one which identifies the particular characteristics of face-toface communication that distinguish it from the post and make it
amenable to the receipt rule. Such a framework has been provided by the
drafters of the Restatement: "Acceptance given by telephone or other
medium of substantially instantaneous two-way communication is
to acceptances where the parties are
governed by the principles applicable
46
in the presence of each other."
This two-prong test requires that a method of communication be
both substantially instantaneous and two-way for it to receive the same
treatment as face-to-face communication with respect to the effective
time of an acceptance. The first prong of the test, substantial instantaneousness, requires that the acceptance be transmitted within a few seconds.47 The second prong of the test, the quality of being "two-way,"
requires that there be interaction among the communicating parties,
allowing each to ensure that there has been understanding by the other.
The following passage clearly describes this quality of being "two way":

file with the Hofstra Law Review). Message retraction is available within certain corporate or
institutional systems, but contract formation in this context--e.g., between employees of the same
company-is unlikely.
46.

RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 64.

47. Actually, the term "substantial" may be vague enough to support an argument that
transmission within a minute or two, or perhaps a larger period of time, is substantially
instantaneous.
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In [two-way] communication, one party can determine readily whether
the other party is aware of the first party's communications, through
immediate verbal response or, when the communication is face-to-face,
through nonverbal cues. When the communication is not instantaneous
and is not face-to-face, there is much greater uncertainty as to whether
the other party is aware of a particular communication."
This two-prong test for determining whether a method of communication should be treated in the same manner as face-to-face communication with respect to the effective time of an acceptance is perhaps best
understood through its application. The telephone, electronic data
interchange, and the facsimile are considered in turn.
The telephone, explicitly delineated by the Restatement as a
substantially instantaneous two-way method of communication, is
perhaps the quintessential example. Telephonic communication is
substantially instantaneous in that there is no delay in communication-one's words are immediately transmitted to the other party. It is
two-way in that the parties communicate in a "back-and-forth" manner
such that they can respond to or interrupt each other; compare this to
communication by post, where the sender corresponds without any
feedback from the addressee, who has no opportunity to alter the course
of the communication.
English courts have followed this analysis and have held that
communications by telephone--as well as by telex,49 a similar method
of communication--are better analogized to face-to-face communication
than to the post, and thus acceptances by such methods are effective
where and when received." Curiously, though, a majority of American
courts have shown an arguably unwarranted allegiance to the mailbox
rule, treating telephoned and telexed acceptances as effective where and

48.

MicHAEL S. BAUM & HENRY H. PERRr-r, JR., ELEcraoNIc CONTRACTING, PUBLISHING

AND EDI LAW 321 (1991).

49. Telex is a "two-way teletypewriter service channeled through a public telecommunications
system for instantaneous, direct communication between private subscribers at remote locations."
THE RANDOM HousE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1351 (rev. ed. 1984). Functionally, the sender types

a message into a teletypewriter as if it were a regular typewriter. The message is instantaneously
transmitted through standard telephone lines to the recipient teletypewriter, which automatically types
the message onto paper.
50. See, e.g., Entores Ld. v. Miles Far East Corp., [1955] 2 Q.B. 327, 332-34 (Eng. C.A.)
(noting that although it is unanimous in common law countries that acceptance by post is effective
upon dispatch, "[o]ommunications by [telephone and telex] are virtually instantaneous and stand on
a different footing," and thus concluding that the "contract is only complete when the acceptance
is received by the offeroer").
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when dispatched, despite the greater similarity of these methods of
communication to face-to-face correspondence."1
The two-prong Restatement test has also been applied to electronic
data interchange, or as commonly called, EDI. 2 EDI is a computerized
contracting system characterized by an ongoing, automatic exchange of
very specific data, such as the quantity of an item to be ordered, between
entities that have a continuous course of dealing. 3 An EDI transaction
might take place, for example, when the inventory of widgets for
company X falls below a specified minimum, and an order is automatically placed by a computer to purchase a specified amount of widgets
from company Y.
Although EDI communications are substantially instantaneous,
satisfying the first prong of the Restatement test, EDI seems, at first
glance, to fail the second prong of the test since EDI communications are
not literally two-way--the communicating computers do not "interact"
in any way so as to clear up any potential "misunderstandings" between
them. If the analysis ended here, EDI would not be treated in the same
manner as face-to-face communication with respect to the effective time
of an acceptance; rather, it would be treated in the same manner as the
post, and the mailbox rule would apply in its context.
But the analysis does not end here because there exists a substitute

51. This issue usually arises in jurisdictional or choice of law cases in which the offeror and
offeree are located in different states. See, e.g., Docutel Corp. v. S. A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209,
1215 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (where acceptance was sent by telex from France to Texas, contract was
made in France, although Texas law was deemed controlling on other grounds); Cardon v. Hampton,
109 So. 176, 177 (Ala. Ct. App. 1926); Ledbetter Erection Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Bd., 203 Cal. Rptr. 396, 400-01 (Ct. App. 1984); Dudley A. Tyng & Co. v. Converse, 146 N.W.
629, 630 (Mich. 1914); Pierce v. Foley Bros., 168 N.W.2d 346, 349, 355 (Minn. 1969); National
Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Center Plywood Co., 405 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); State ex
rel. Hartwig's Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Bunde, 170 N.W.2d 734, 736-47 (Wis. 1969).
A minority of courts do analogize telephone conversation to face-to-face communication,
holding that the contract is formed in the state where the offeror hears the acceptance. See, eg.,
Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Exeter Mfg. Co. v. Glass-Craft
Boats, Inc., 173 A.2d 791, 794 (N.H. 1961); Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 139 A.2d 638,
640 (Pa. 1958).
52. See, e.g., Thomas L. Lockhart & Patrick A. Miles, Jr., No More Pulp Fiction: Proposed
UCCArticle2Revisions EmbracePaperlessElectronic Transactions,75 MICH. BJ. 516,519 (1996)
(discussing the proposed revisions to the UCC which would abolish the mailbox rule in the context
of certain electronic exchanges); Electronic Messaging Servs. Task Force, American Bar Ass'n, The
Commercial Use ofElectronicDataInterchange-A Report and Model Trading PartnerAgreement,
45 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1732 (1990) [hereinafter Model Trading Partner Agreement] (suggesting
abolishment of the mailbox rule in the context of EDI).
53. See generally BAUM & PERRITT, JR., supra note 48, § 1.2; BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW

OF ELECTRONIC COMMRCE 22-25 (1991); Model Trading PartnerAgreement, supra note 52.
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for the two-way quality of a method of communication. Since the
purpose of the two-way requirement is to provide for assurance of
receipt, if receipt can be ensured in another manner, such as through an
accurate computer acknowledgment, than the requirement that a
communication be two-way can be eliminated. Michael S. Baum and
Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. have stated that "[t]he two-way part of the
Restatement description may be problematic for EDI exchanges that are
not two-way, but it is important to understand that the Restatement
drafters used the term 'two-way' because that type of communication
enhances awareness and reduces mistake potential."'' Thus, although
EDI communications are not literally two-way, EDI should nevertheless
be afforded the same treatment as face-to-face communication-and
acceptances transmitted via EDI should be effective only upon receipt--because such receipt can be confirmed with an accurate computer
acknowledgment.
The facsimile is similar to EDI in that fax transmissions are
substantially instantaneous, but are not literally two-way--fax machines
do not interact with each other. Thus, a faxed acceptance will satisfy the
second prong of the Restatement test, and should be effective upon
receipt, only if it is transmitted from a fax machine that is capable of
accurately confirming its error-free transmission. On the other hand, an
acceptance transmitted from a fax machine that lacks such an ability to
confirm receipt will fail the second prong of the Restatement test, and
should be effective upon mere dispatch.
E. The Demise of the Mailbox Rule?
The above analysis indicates that substantially instantaneous twoway forms of communication are better suited to the receipt rule than to
the mailbox rule. Accordingly, a number of commentators have suggested
that the mailbox rule may be facing its demise as the use of substantially
instantaneous two-way forms of communication begins to predominate
over the use of the post.55 But this Note posits that these commentators

54. BAUM & PEmuRr, JR., supra note 48, at 324 n.63.
55. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.22, at 182 ("The [mailbox] rule has no application

to substantially instantaneous means of communication, such as the telephone, telex, and electronic
mail; the increasing use of such means has undoubtedly diminished the practical importance of the
rule."); EDWARD L MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 340 (4th ed.
1991) (suggesting that the mailbox rule may be facing its demise as more and more contracting
occurs via EDI); Eisler, supra note 19, at 583 (suggesting that the receipt rule be used in all
circumstances because "[m]ail and telegram are the exception," while "[telephone, fax, and EDI are
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have overlooked and misunderstood what may be the last bastion for the
mailbox rule--Internet electronic mail, or Internet "e-mail." The next two
Parts of this Note demonstrate, respectively, that Internet e-mail is a very
viable modem method of communication that should not be overlooked,
and that it possesses somewhat misunderstood characteristics that make
it better suited to the mailbox rule than to the receipt rule.
I. INTERNET ELECTRONIC MAIL
A.

Introduction

Electronic mailV6 refers to a method of communication whereby the
sender types a message into a computer terminal or workstation and then
electronically transmits it to the receiver, who reads the message on a
computer terminal or workstation. 7 The sender and receiver must each
be part of an e-mail system, which is loosely defined as a group of
individuals who use a common entity, and a common server, to handle
their messaging needs. A server is a central computer which acts as an
intermediary in collecting and dispatching both outgoing and incoming
messages for its various users. A typical e-mail system might be
comprised of the employees of a company or the subscribers to an e-mail
service provider such as Compuserve or MCI Mail. 8

now the common and reasonable means of communication").
56. E-mail as discussed in this Note must be distinguished from a related technology, EDI,
described supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
57. Much of the computer information presented herein has been acquired through my
experience as a Local Area Network ("LAN") Administrator and as an independent computer
consultant. I have worked with e-mail on LANs, see infra note 59, mainframe systems, see infranote
59, and through the on-line service Compuserve, see infra note 58. 1 have also conducted interviews
with a number of institutional system administrators, and have made various inquiries to the
customer support representatives of the on-line service Compuserve. For general descriptions of email, see LEE SPROULL & SARA KIESLER, CONNECTIONS 177-84 (1991); Amelia H. Boss & William
J.Woodward, Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code; Survey of Computer ContractingCases, 43
Bus. LAw. 1513, 1520 (1988); Robert H. Thomas, "Hey, Did You Get My E-Mail?" Reflections of
a Retro-Grouch in the Computer Age ofLegal Education, 44 J.LEGAL EDUC.233, 236-37 (1994).
58. Individuals will generally obtain e-mail access through a provider which collects and
distributes the messages of its various subscribers. On-line services, including Compuserve, America
On-Line and Prodigy, will invariably provide e-mail access to all of its users. Any individual who
has a computer and a modem can subscribe to one of these services, which provide a plethora of
features in addition to e-mail for a monthly fee of approximately 11 dollars. The "basic services"
included in the monthly fee typically include weather reports, stock quotes, reference materials, and
on-line shopping. For additional fees, users may enter what are known as "forums." A forum is an
arena in which people with a common interest can exchange ideas. For instance, in a cooking forum,
one can go into a library and look for recipes that other members of the forum may have posted.
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Being a member of a system is only the most basic requirement of
e-mail messaging. In a more physical sense, an e-mail user must access
an "end-user" computer which can communicate with the server. Such
communication requires physical connection to the server and the
installation of the appropriate software. Physical connection between an
end-user computer and the server is achieved either through direct
cabling 9 or through telephone lines, in which case both the end-user
computer and the server must be equipped with a modem. Softvare
refers to the nonphysical component of computer operation; it is computer programming which manipulates information and provides the user
with an interface to the physical computer.6 ° Interfaces are generally of
two types, textual and graphical. Textual interfaces present information
as simple text on the computer monitor; users generally perform
functions by typing in commands at a prompt. 6' Graphical user interfac-

One can also "chat" with another user and ask questions or exchange ideas. "Chatting" is the term
given to simultaneous or "real-time" communication between the parties. In other words, both parties
are sitting at their terminals, typing messages, and immediately awaiting responses from the other
party. See generallyDAN GoOKIN & ANDY RATHBONE, PCs FOR DUMMIES 279-99 (3d ed. 1995);
TINA RATHBONE, MODEMS FOR DUMMIES 317-45 (2d ed. 1994).
MCI Mail is a worldwide service, introduced in 1983, which focuses on transmitting
messages via various media including e-mail. See Eisler, supra note 19, at 567.
59. Cabling a number of computers together has the advantage of allowing them to share
information (such as e-mail messages) and resources (such as printers). Such connection is generally
accomplished through two types of configurations, namely, computer networks and mainframe
systems. Computer networks (LANs, which are confined to discrete locations, or Wide Area
Networks, or "WANs,' which span distant locations) consist of a number of fully functional personal
computers, or workstations, that are connected together and share the resources of a central computer
called the file server. Personal computers are typically of one of two types: IBM machines (or a
plethora of IBM-compatibles such as Gateway, Zeos, and Compaq), known as "PCs," and Macintosh
machines, known as "Macs." Being "fully functional" means that each computer on the network has
independent resources such as memory and hard disk space, and can function as a stand-alone unit.
See generally GOOKIN & RATHBONE, supra note 58, at 267-77; RON WHITE, How COMPUTERS
WORK 150-61 (2d ed. 1995).

Mainframe systems, on the other hand, involve a central computer which does all of the
necessary processing and then sends information to the users through "dumb terminals." These
terminals typically have no resources and no processing power and thus would be useless apart from
the mainf-ame system; they simply pass on the information that the mainframe computer sends to
them. See, eg., GOOKIN & RATHBONE, supra note 58, at 267.
60. See, eg., GOOKIN & RATHnOE,4, supra note 58, at 247. Typical types of software include
wordprocessors, spreadsheets, databases, presentation packages, and of course, e-mail. With
mainframe systems, the software is actually installed on the central mainframe computer, not on the
"dumb terminals," which have no independent resources. See supra note 59. With networks, the
software may be installed centrally on the file server, for use by all workstations, or may be installed
locally on each workstation.
61. DOS (which uses a C:> prompt) and UNIX (which uses a $ prompt) are popular operating
systems which use a textual interface.
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es (or GUIs) present information in a descriptive, colorful, and pictorial
manner and allow users to perform functions by clicking on parts of the
screen with a mouse, rather than by typing in complicated, nonintuitive
keystrokes.62
The simplest e-mail transmissions are intrasystem, involving only
the sender, the recipient, and their common server. Until recently,
intersystem communications were not possible because of hardware and
software incompatibilities, so that the audience with which an e-mail user
could communicate was limited to those within the user's particular
system. Thus an employee of company X could not send an e-mail
message to an employee of company Y, and similarly, a Compuserve
subscriber could not send an e-mail message to an MCI Mail subscriber.
This severe limitation that hampered e-mail is perhaps best understood
through an analogy with the telephone--imagine the frustration facing an
AT&T subscriber who is unable to telephone a business associate
because the latter subscribes to MCI.
Lifting this limitation and greatly increasing the usefulness of e-mail
was the development of Internet technology-a standard method of
computer connectivity and file transmission which allows for communication between dissimilar systems.63 By connecting its server to the
Internet, a system may thereby allow its members to communicate with
members of other systems that have likewise connected their servers to
the Internet." The bottom line is that an e-mail user can now send a
message to just about any other e-mail user, regardless of the identities
of their respective service providers.

62. Microsoft Windows is a popular graphical user interface which is used on IBM compatible
computers. A graphical user interface is inherent in Macintosh computers.
63. One computer dictionary defines the Internet as "[a] system of linked computer networks,
worldwide in scope, that facilitates data communication services such as remote login, file transfer,
electronic mail, and newsgroups. The Internet is a way of connecting existing computer networks
that greatly extends the reach of each particular system." BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, QuE's COMPurER
& INTERNET DICTIONARY 269 (6th ed. 1995). Internet connectivity is now rather extensive and is
increasing at a rampant pace. See id. (estimating its number of users in 1995 at 20 million, increasing

at a rate of I million per month, and its number of computers at 2 million); RATHEoNF, supra note
58, at 19 (estimating its number of users in 1994 at 20 million, increasing at a rate of 20% per
month).

To access the Internet, one typically needs a computer, a modem, Internet software (popular
packages include Netscape and Mosaic), and a contract with an Internet service provider, which may
charge a flat monthly fee or a fee based on usage. Many on-line services have now incorporated
Internet access into their software, eliminating the need to utilize a separate entity solely to provide

this service.
64. See RATHBONE, supra note 58, at 324 for a good schematic diagram of Internet

connectivity.
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B. Advantages and Disadvantages

E-mail combines a variety of useful features which make it superior
in many respects to communication by post, phone, or fax-it is kind of
a hybrid of the three, combining the best features of each. It enjoys at
least four advantages over each of the post, phone, and fax. 5 First, an
e-mail message can be sent to hundreds of dispersed recipients at

once."6 By comparison, although a voice mail message can be sent to
multiple recipients within the same system, it cannot be sent to recipients
that are outside of the system, such as employees of other companies. As
for the post, although procedures can be implemented to make mass
mailing more efficient, it is still necessary to produce a copy of the
message and a customized envelope for each recipient, steps which are
unnecessary in the context of e-mail.

Second, e-mail messages are in a computer readable format, and
thus can be saved, manipulated, edited, and used in other documents.

Compare this to a phone call or voice mail, creating a record for which
requires taking notes. Similarly, useful information from a facsimile
generally must be retyped into a computer document.67 Third, e-mail

65. See generallyJoyce Cutlip et al., The Joys and Drawback ofE-Mail, LEGAL TIMES, Jan.
22, 1996, at S32; sources cited supra note 57. This material has been supplemented with some
personal experiences and observations.
66. This can be done in three ways. First, a user may type in the addresses of multiple
recipients before composing a message. This is cumbersome and impractical in that e-mail addresses
are often very long and difficult to memorize. Alternatively, a user may select multiple recipients
by name from a computer address book, in which the cumbersome addresses of other e-mail users
are stored. Finally, a user may enter individuals into a group, such as "All Employees" or "Parties
Involved in Project X," and thereafter select the group as the recipient of e-mail messages.
67. Actually, this retyping can be avoided in some cases through the use of a scanner and
optical character recognition ("OCR") software. A scanner is a device which looks much like a
miniature photocopy machine. A piece of paper is placed on the glass and its contents are then
scanned into an unintelligible computer image. Unintelligible means that the computer does not
recognize letters or words or lines at this point-a memorandum that has been scanned might as well
be a Picasso. The OCR software makes the image "intelligent" by examining it for letters and words,
and converting it into a computer document that can be edited or used in other software packages,
principally wordprocessors.
Unfortunately, this technology is full of pitfalls and should be used with caution. It is not
uncommon for the software to recognize characters incorrectly or not at all, especially if the original
is not of a sharp quality. Thus the word "fully" might be recognized as "fIMI-" (note that the I'"
is now a "v" and the "'s are now "l"s; the "-" indicates that the "y" was not recognized at all).
Thus, examination and updating of the document after recognition is necessary, substantially
defeating the purpose of the technology. Further, although the OCR software attempts to retain
formatting (such as margins, tabs, bold, and italics), it often does a very poor job. The limiting effect
of all this is that OCR technology should only be used when the originals to be scanned are very
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provides excellent message management. Messages are easy to skim and
scan since relevant information, such as the sender and subject of each
message, is usually displayed in a very structured format, allowing the
user to quickly decide which messages to read immediately, which to
read at a later time, and which to delete without reading. Finally, there
may be some situations in which there is no other choice but to use email, this being the case when the parties know of each other only
through computer connectivity. For example, one may post an advertisement over the Internet which requires that interested parties reply through
e-mail.
E-mail enjoys a significant advantage specifically over the
telephone-an advantage that it shares with the post and the
fax-namely, asynchronism, meaning that the sender and the recipient do
not communicate simultaneously. Three distinct benefits are gained from
this characteristic. First, messages can be sent and read at one's convenience-there is no need to determine a time which is mutually
convenient for the communicating parties. Second, its asynchronous
nature makes e-mail less spontaneous than the telephone, giving the
sender the opportunity to communicate information in an organized
manner without interruption.6 Third, there is no need for social
interaction when sending an e-mail message. This allows for the
avoidance of time-consuming conversations, and also gives the less social
among us, who may have much to contribute, a forum in which to freely
present their ideas.
E-mail has three advantages-which it shares with the telephone-over the post and the fax. First, e-mail messages can be sent and
received from any location with a phone line, provided that the user has
a personal computer equipped with a modem.69 Second, sending e-mail
is very simple and convenient, especially for those who have computers
at their desks. As compared to the post, there is no need to find a piece
of paper, an envelope, a pen, and a stamp, and no need to physically
mail a letter. As compared to the fax, there is no need to produce a
hardcopy, and no need to walk to the fax machine, where there may be

crisp and clean, and when the user does not desire to retain formatting. In the end, disgruntled users
will often wish they had avoided this technology and simply retyped the information.
68. Of course, when issues are unclear or need to be resolved through collaboration, interaction
is required.

69. The phone is actually superior to e-mail in this respect since retrieving voice mail messages
requires no special equipment.
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a line, to physically fax a letter.7" Third, e-mail and the phone are more
environmentally friendly than the post and the fax because they do not
use paper.7

E-mail does have a number of disadvantages.7' As compared to
each of the phone, the post, and the fax, there are at least two. First, e-

mail users must exercise care in considering the content of their
communications in that e-mail messages may leave a discoverable written
trail and may be intercepted. Of course, it is possible that a phone line
could be tapped, or that mail could be intercepted by a postal or
mailroom employee, but the newly-created, ever-evolving, and somewhat

mysterious realm of e-mail--and particularly the Internet, which is not
regulated or administered by any particular organization-is much more

susceptible to undetected intrusion by computer "hackers" or experts.
Second, it is not uncommon for some recipients to ignore e-mail
messages, so it can be dangerous for a sender to assume that a message
has been read in a timely fashion.
With respect to the phone, e-mail--along with the post and the
fax-is inferior in that it cannot communicate the emotion or tone of a
message as can a telephone conversation or a voice mail message.7 3 As
compared to the post and the fax, e-mail--along with the phone--is

lacking in at least two ways. First, systems which notify the user of
incoming messages can be very distracting. Although the notification
function of an e-mail software package may be deactivated (as may the
ringer on a telephone), this must be weighed against the desire or

necessity of prompt notice of incoming communication. Second, it is

70. Actually, the technology now exists whereby a facsimile may be sent or received from a
personal computer, limiting this advantage with respect to faxes to those which are sent via
traditional fax machines. A number of software packages are now available, such as Delrina Winfax
Pro, which allow for this functionality. A document which is composed in any software package may
be faxed without ever exiting the software package simply by "printing" to a modem as one would
print to a printer. Incoming faxes are stored graphically in the computer, this can be a useful feature
when a hardeopy is lost.
One caveat to this very reliable, useful, and highly recommended technology is that outgoing
faxes are limited to computer files. Faxes which are not computer files, such as invoices or
handwritten notes, cannot be sent unless they are first scanned into the computer as graphics files.
See supra note 67 for a description of scanning.
71. See, eg., Susan Gilbert, An EnvironmentalChecklistfor Your Law Office, LEGAL MOMT.,
May/June 1994, at 26.
72. See generally Cutlip et al., supra note 65; sources cited supra note 57. This material has
been supplemented with some personal experiences and observations.
73. This is not entirely true, as various means may be used to communicate emotion in e-mail
messages. For instance, a user may type in CAPITAL LETTERS to imply a raised tone of voice,
or may type a rotated smiling face, :-), to indicate laughter.
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often necessary to communicate not a text message, but a specific
document such as an invoice or a copy of a memorandum. While this
can be done by post or fax, it cannot be done by phone or e-mail.74
C.

Viability

As discussed above, certain characteristics of e-mail distinguish it
as a viable form of communication. It has substantive merits that make
it superior to other forms of communication,75 and the infrastructure is
now in place (the Internet) which allows for the exchange of messages
between users of varying e-mail systems. 76 But the ultimate litmus test
of the viability of a method of communication is the frequency with
which it is used, and e-mail posts some impressive numbers in this
respect. Projections indicate that by the year 2000, forty million
Americans will subscribe to an e-mail service, transmitting sixty billion
messages per year.77 Thus it is clear that e-mail is a now a viable and
widely used method of communication. 7 But more specifically, and
more significantly with respect to this Note, it is clear that e-mail is now
a viable contracting medium. 79 Perhaps the greatest tribute to e-mail in
this respect are proposed revisions to Article 2 of the UCC which deal
with paperless communication technologies."
D. A ProperMedium for Transmitting an Acceptance?
The foregoing section discusses the general viability of e-mail as a
form of communication. A related issue is whether the law will recognize
the use of e-mail where it is used to transmit an acceptance.

74. Actually, some e-mail systems allow images to be attached to e-mail text messages, but
the process can be cumbersome and limited. Also, utilization of this capability requires that the
sender have access to a scanner so that the image can be converted into a computer file. See supra

note 67 for a description of scanners.
75. See supra Part 111.B.

76. See supra Part H1.A.
77. See Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacyand the
FederalWiretap Statute,44 AM. U. L. REV. 219, 221 n.7 (1994).
78. See, e.g., Carl P. Deluca, Legal Bytes, R.I. B.J., Nov. 1996, at 23, 23 ("It will only be a

matter of a year or so before everybody but the most antiquated businesses, professionals, and
individuals have e-mail accounts").
79. See, e.g., Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace,29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 86 (1996) ("Offer and acceptance occurs in email.... Disputes will certainly arise regarding the formation ... of contractual obligations").

80. See generally Lockhart & Miles, Jr., supra note 52. Although these changes seem to be
directed more toward EDI, they do contemplate e-mail communications as well.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 25:971

Under the modem view, the medium used by the offeree to transmit
an acceptance is proper if it conforms to the offer's specifications, or, if
the offer is silent, if it is the medium used by the offeror or any other
medium reasonable under the circumstances." The situations where the
offeror specifies the medium to be used82 and where the offer and
acceptance are transmitted via the same medium 3 lend themselves to
straightforward analyses. The more difficult situation is presented where
the offer is silent as to the mode of acceptance and where the acceptance
and offer are transmitted via different media. Although the above rule
begs a case-specific inquiry into the reasonableness of the medium used
by the offeree to transmit the acceptance, courts tend to designate the
post as reasonable in a conclusory fashion, only straying from this
determination in unusual circumstances.' A recent case has afforded the
facsimile similar treatment.85

81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 65 (1981); see also Polhamus v. Roberts,
175 P.2d 196, 199 (N.M. 1946) (holding that authorized methods of acceptance are determined by
what can be reasonably expected by the contracting parties); Farley v. Champs Fine Foods, Inc., 404
NAV.2d 493, 494-95 (N.D. 1987) (holding that any "reasonable and usual" mode of acceptance may
be used where the mode of acceptance is not specified by the offeror).
The significance of transmitting an acceptance via a "proper" medium is that it will be
effective upon dispatch, regardless of whether it is actually received. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACrs § 65 cmt. a. An acceptance transmitted via an improper medium may nevertheless
be effective as of the date of dispatch, but only if it is actually received within the time in which a
properly dispatched acceptance would have been received. See id. § 67.
Some courts maintain an older view which focuses on the authorization given by the offeror
to use a particular medium as opposed to the reasonableness of the medium used. Where the offer
is silent as to the mode ofacceptance, authorization is impliedly given to use the same medium that
the offeror used to transmit the offer. See, eg., Hayne v. Cook, 109 N.W.2d 188, 195 (Iowa 1961);
2 WILUSTON & LORD,supra note 13, § 6:35, at 382-84.
82. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. American States Ins. Co., 763 F. Supp. 228, 231-32 (S.D. Ohio
1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1991).
83. See, e.g., Hayne, 109 N.W.2d at 196.
84. See, e.g., APC Operating Partnership v. Mackey, 841 F.2d 1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 1988);
Palo Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v. BBTC Co., 521 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Cal. 1974); Travelers
Ins. Co.v. Tufte, 435 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 65 cmt. c. But see Eisler, supra note 19, at 583 ("Mail and telegram are the
exception. Telephone, fax, and EDI are now the common and reasonable means of communication.").
For a case where use of the post was deemed to be unreasonable, see ParkrEnterprisesv.
New Century Realty,Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1982) (holding acceptance by mail unreasonable
where vendor's agent personally delivered offer to vendor and counteroffer to purchaser and where
counteroffer required acceptance within 48 hours).
85. See Hofer v. Young, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27, 29 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Defendants elected to
communicate their assent by fax, a reasonable and increasingly common means of modem
communication.'). As with the post, the use of the fax has been deemed unreasonable in some
instances. See, eg., Clow Water Sys. Co., Div. of McWane, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 441,445-46 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding use of fax unreasonable where past practice of parties was to communicate by
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It is questionable whether courts will afford e-mail this same
presumption of reasonableness. Until e-mail more firmly establishes
itself, it is more likely that courts will scrutinize carefully the facts
surrounding the transmission of acceptances via e-mail, and that
outcomes will be highly fact dependent. Factors to be considered are the
speed and reliability of e-mail, the prior course of dealing between the
parties, and the usage of trade.86 The Restatement adds that "[t]he
concept of reasonableness is flexible, and its applicability may be
enlarged as new media develop or existing media become more speedy
or reliable or come into more general use., 87 This bodes well for e-mail,
as its usage numbers are quite impressive.88
E.

Nature of Dispatch

As this Note concludes that courts are likely to retain the dispatch
rule in the context of e-mail, a discussion of the nature of such dispatch
is in order. Generally, an acceptance is considered to be dispatched when
it is put out of the possession of the offeree into the control of a third
party authorized to receive it.89 The third party may be a public service
instrumentality, such as the United States Postal Service, or a private
service which is independent of the offeree and which can be relied on
to keep accurate records, such as the United Parcel Service or Federal
Express." On the other hand, the third party may not be a mail clerk
within the office of the offeree9 ' or an agent of the offeree.92
With respect to e-mail, for a message to be "put out of the
possession of the offeree," it must, as a preliminary matter, be dispatched
from the offeree's end-user computer. This is accomplished by performing the system-specific function for sending the message,9 3 and
telephone and where offeree had sent only four faxes to offeror during their 13 months of
negotiations).
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 65 cmt. b.

87. Id
88. See supra text accompanying note 77.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a) & cmt. e. One court has described
this "control test" as follows: "There must be some irrevocable element such as depositing the

acceptance in the mail so that it is placed beyond the power or control of the sender before the
acceptance becomes effective and the contract is made." Pribil v. Ruther, 262 N.V.2d 460, 462

(Neb. 1978).
90. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a) cmt. e.
91. See, e.g., Gibbs v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 266 Cal. Rptr. 517, 519 (Ct. App. 1990).

92. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Behee, 786 S.W.2d 610, 611-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
93. This may mean clicking the "Send" button in Microsoft Windows-based systems or typing
the keystroke combination Ctrl-Z in some UNIX-based systems.
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receiving the system acknowledgment that the message was sent
successfully.94 If such an acknowledgment is unavailable, the offeree
must check for any indications that the message was not sent properly.
For instance, if the computer "freezes" upon sending the message,
meaning that the computer does not respond to any keystrokes or mouse
movements, the offeree should be on alert that the message. may not have
been sent successfully, and should resend the message.
Where the offeree's server is not under the offeree's control, but is
under the control of an independent entity such as an on-line service
provider, such that the message cannot be retracted, nothing further is
required for proper dispatch. 95 As the "third party" in this case, the
entity which controls the server might be analogized to96the United Parcel
Service or Federal Express in the context of the post.
A different scenario is presented where the server is within the
control of the offeree, as is typically the case with large companies that
operate their own mail servers. Here, the offeree's dispatch of the
acceptance from the end-user computer is insufficient because the
message has not been handed over to an independent third party. Rather,
it is sitting in the offeree's own server and it presumably can be
retracted, thus failing the control test. Accordingly, in this scenario there
is an additional requirement for a proper dispatch-the offeree's server
must pass the message onto the Internet. Only at this point is the
message truly out
of the control of the offeree and in the possession of
97
a "third party."

F Nature of Receipt
Although this Note argues that the dispatch rule should be applied
to acceptances transmitted via e-mail, a discussion of what constitutes
receipt of an e-mail message is relevant for at least two reasons. First,
where e-mail is an unauthorized medium of communication, an
acceptance will nevertheless be effective if it is received seasonably.9

94. Usually an annotation such as "message sent successfully" will appear in a designated area
on the screen.
95. The server is the intermediary computer which receives the message from the sender and
then dispatches it to the Internet. See supra Part ILIA.A
96. As with private entities that handle the post, the entity that controls the server must meet
certain standards regarding reliability and recordkeeping.
97. The Internet is not truly a third party because it is not controlled by any single entity. But
what is significant is that the sender cannot retract the message once it has reached the Internet.
98. See supra note 81.
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Second, while acceptances are normally effective upon dispatch, offers,
revocations, and rejections are generally effective only upon receipt.9 9
Using the post as a starting point for analysis:
A written revocation, rejection, or acceptance is received when the
writing comes into the possession of the person addressed, or of some
person authorized by him to receive it for him, or when it is deposited
in some place which he has authorized as the place for this or similar
communications to be deposited for him."°°
A letter need not be read for it to be considered received, nor need it
reach the hands of the addressee. For example, receipt may be proper
where a letter is delivered to a servant of the addressee, or is placed in
the addressee's mailbox.1"'
In a similar vein, it should not be necessary for an e-mail message
to be read to be considered received. Rather, an e-mail message should
be deemed received when it reaches the server-or "computer
mailroom'-of the addressee." ° Note that receipt is a simpler concept
with e-mail than with the post because e-mail messages are computer
files which do not have the freedom of movement of tangible letters. For
instance, whereas a letter addressed to an executive may be placed on the
desk of an assistant, it is not possible for an e-mail message addressed
to an executive to mysteriously or accidentally appear in the e-mail
account of an assistant. The only "place" where an e-mail message may
feasibly be "deposited" is the server of the addressee.
Three corollaries to this rule are of significance. First, just as there
is no receipt where a postal employee fails to deposit a letter in the
addressee's physical mailbox, there is no receipt where the Internet, due
to its own error, fails to deliver an e-mail message to the addressee's
server. Second, an addressee of an e-mail message may not claim

99. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 68 (1981).
101. See, eg., id § 68 cmt. a, illus. 1; see also Logan v. Corinth-Alcom County Joint Airport
Bd., 665 F. Supp. 506, 511 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (holding that letter hand-delivered to recipient's
secretary was received within the meaning of a statute); Holmes v. Myles, 37 So. 588, 589 (Ala.
1904) (holding effective an acceptance left at the house of the offeror before the expiration of the
option period but not actually read until after the expiration of the option period); Town of Newport
v. State, 345 A.2d 402, 404 (N.H. 1975) ("Receipt of the notices by the town office constituted
actual delivery as a notice by mail is considered to have reached a recipient when it is delivered
where he normally receives mail."); Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362, 365 (1875) (holding effective an
acceptance which never actually reached the offeror, but was deposited in the offeror's letter box at
his theater, which was sometimes used for the deposit of such acceptances).
102. See supra Part III.A.
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nonreceipt based on a failure to retrieve a message that was sitting in the
server--there is a duty to check for e-mail messages just as there is a
duty to check for physical mail.
A third, related corollary is that the addressee of an e-mail message
may not claim nonreceipt based on the failure of the addressee's server
to dispatch the message to the end-user computer--the above rule
requires only that the message reach the server, not that the server
properly dispatch it to the addressee. 3 This is the case even though a
diligent addressee may be unaware that the message is awaiting retrieval.
Where the server is within the control of the addressee, the rationale for
finding receipt is that an entity should be charged with the proper
operation of its equipment; analogously, one court charged a company
with the proper functioning of its mailroom."° A more difficult
situation is presented where the server is not within the control of the addressee, because one of two innocent parties must suffer. The addressee
should be the one to suffer because, unlike the sender of the message, it
has a direct relationship (contractual) with the blameworthy party. °5
There is one important exception to the general rule that an e-mail
message is deemed received when it reaches the server of the addressee:
Where a message fails to reach the server of the addressee due to the
inoperation of the server,0 6 the message will nevertheless be deemed
received. The rationales for this exception-which deals with a defective
server which will not accept messages from the Internet-are similar to
the rationales for finding receipt where a defective server accepts
messages from the Internet but fails to properly dispatch them to the
appropriate addressees. 7

103. I had an experience where a corporate server received but did not deliver messages for a
period of two weeks. Once the problem was corrected, the accumulated messages were delivered
simultaneously.
104. See Thomson Printing Mach. Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 714 F.2d 744,748 (7th Cir. 1983)

("[W]e think Goodrich's mailroom mishandled the confirmatory writings. This failure should not
permit Goodrich to escape liability by pleading nonreceipt.').
105. The injured addressee is not left without a remedy as recourse may be sought against the
operator of the server.
106. Unable to reach its destination, the message will float back over the Internet to the sender
with an indication that delivery was not possible.

107. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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IV. IS INTERNET ELECTRONIC MAIL A "SUBSTANTIALLY
INSTANTANEOUS TWO-WAY" FORM OF COMMUNICATION?

As stated above, to justify dispensing with the mailbox rule in the
context of a particular method of communication, the method of
communication must be substantially instantaneousness and two-way. 108
Internet e-mail is now examined for each of these characteristics in turn.
A.

Substantially Instantaneous?

Varying perceptions about the instantaneousness of e-mail may be
found throughout the literature. Some have designated e-mail as
absolutely instantaneous, without qualification."0 9 Others have retreated
to some ' extent,
describing e-mail as "substantially," 110 "nearly,"' or
"almost"" 2 instantaneous. One author has shown an even greater degree of uncertainty about the speed of e-mail transmissions, stating
merely that "some would consider" e-mail to be "almost" instantaneous." 3 Another author seems unable to reach a conclusion on the
issue, adopting the position that e-mail is "virtually" instantaneous, then
somewhat contradictorily stating that e-mail messages "take a few
minutes to get around the internet.""1 4 At the other end of the spectrum,
a minority of commentators have suggested that e-mail is not instanta5
neous.lI
Whether the term instantaneous is being misunderstood or is being
applied with varying degrees of precision is largely irrelevant. For
purposes of this Note, the term is being used to determine the existence

108. See supra Part Il.D.
109. See, e.g., Keith B. Norman, The ASB Home Page: Alabama Lawyers Go On-Line for a
Wealth of Information, 57 ALA. LAW. 328, 328 (1996) (stating that e-mail messages are "delivered
instantly"); Cheryl M. Stanton, Comment, Organizing Online: Union Solicitation on Employers'
E-Mail Systems, 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 653, 662 (stating that "e-mail arrives instantly").
110. See text accompanying supra note 1.
111. See Burnstein, supra note 79, at 79.
112. See Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Frameworkfor
Addressing Liability and JurisdictionalIssues in This New Frontier,59 ALB. L. REV. 1083, 1086
n.10 (1996).
113. See Doris Estelle Long, The ProtectionofInformation Technology in a CulturallyDiverse
Marketplace, 15 1 MARSHALL J. COMPtrrER & INFo. L. 129, 131 (1996).
114. Bruce G. Pollock, Computingforthe Small Law Office-FreeE-Mail, R.I. BJ., Oct. 1996,
at 23, 23.
115. See Mary Frances Lapidus, Using Modem Technology to Communicate with Clients:
Proceedwith Caution and Common Sense, HOUSTON LAW., SeptJOct. 1996, at 39, 41; Lawrence
M. Friedman, A Quick Ride on the Internet (Part1), CBA REC., Sept. 1995, at 42, 43.
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of contractual obligations, and thus a clear and consistent meaning must
be adopted. As the following account of the transmission of an e-mail
message indicates, the journey that an e-mail message makes in reaching
its destination is less akin to a world class sprinter dashing from the start
to the finish line, than to a cross-country backpacker travelling from the
East to the West Coast in a circuitous manner, stopping periodically to
rest or to await the arrival of colleagues."t 6 Thus, the proper view is
that e-mail is not instantaneous.
After being typed into existence at the computer of the sending
party, an e-mail message begins its journey by travelling to the server of
the sending party, which acts as a central point for the collection and dispatch of messages from a number of computers, much like a corporate
mailroom in the context of the post. The server then sends the message
through a gateway"' into the Internet, much like a corporate mailroom
hands a letter over to the postal service. At this point the message and
its security are out of the control of the sending party.
Next, the message travels over the Internet in an acrobatic and
disjointed fashion-it is broken up into a number of smaller pieces,8
which independently find their way to their common destination,"
travelling over and residing on a number of computers along the
way "9 The message travels in this manner so as to avoid heavily
congested or inoperative parts of the Internet, thus reaching its destination in as timely a fashion as possible. Finally, the Internet hands the
message over to the server of the recipient, which puts the fragmented
message back together and places it in the recipient's computer mailbox, 2' where it awaits retrieval.'
Despite common belief, the process described above does not take

116. The information in this Part has been gathered from a number of sources, including my
experience as a LAN administrator and as an independent computer consultant. I have also
conducted interviews with a number of institutional system administrators, and have made various
inquiries to the customer support representatives of the on-line service Compuserve.
117. A gateway is a computer, on which the appropriate software is installed, which manipulates
the message into a standard form which is acceptable to the Internet and the various dissimilar
systems connected to it. It might be thought of as a universal translator.
118. See, e.g., E-mail from Ryan Robbins, Customer Service Representative, Compuserve (Jan.
17, 1996) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
119. See, e.g., Lapidus, supra note 115, at 39.
120. In a physical sense, an e-mail user's computer mailbox is that portion of the server's
storage capacity that is designated to hold e-mail messages. In a practical sense, a message being
in a user's computer mailbox means that it is available for retrieval.
121. Note that delivery is complete not when the message reaches the computer of the recipient,
but merely when it reaches the recipient's server. See supra Part III.F.
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place in a substantially instantaneous manner. Rather, it will typically
take minutes, hours, or in some cases, days."2 Perhaps what creates
confusion is the true substantial instantaneousness of intrasystem
messages, which do not involve the Internet, or the occasional transmission of an Internet e-mail message in a substantially instantaneous
manner. Or perhaps the cause of confusion is the substantially instantaneous nature of message transmission as the message passes through the
wires themselves. But often overlooked are the "stops" that the message
makes along the way, at the various servers and nodes that process it,
breaking it up into pieces and reassembling it, or redirecting it to a less
congested portion of the Internet, or holding it until other messages are
received, for a simultaneous, periodic dispatch. Further, one of the stops
may be inoperative, causing the message to be delayed or never received
at all.
Authors Baum and Perritt, Jr. have captured the enigmatic nature of
the speed of e-mail transmissions in stating that "[c]omputerized offers
and acceptances can involve 'substantially instantaneous two-way
communication,' although delays occur when store-and-forward ...
techniques are used."1" They suggest, as does this Note, that where
such delays are involved, some type of mailbox rule may be appropri1 24
ate.
B.

Two-Way?

The second characteristic that a method of communication must
possess, in addition to substantial instantaneousness, to warrant the same
treatment as face-to-face communication with respect to the effective
time of an acceptance, is the quality of being two-way. Curiously, the
focus on the instantaneousness of modem methods of communication
often causes this two-way quality to be overlooked. For instance, one
author simply omits a two-way analysis and focuses solely on instantaneousness in suggesting that the mailbox rule be dispensed with due to
the availability of modem methods of communication." z Similarly,
Professor Farnsworth fails to discuss whether e-mail is two-way in

122. See e.g., E-mail from Ryan Robbins, Customer Service Representative, Compuserve (Jan.
17, 1996) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Friedman, supra note 115, at 43.
123. BAUM & PERRIm, JR., supra note 48, at 324.
124. See Ud at 320 n.46.
125. See Eisler, supra note 19, at 583 ("If the offer and acceptance can be transmitted in an
instant, the situation becomes more like a face-to-face bargaining.").
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stating that the mailbox rule has no application in its context.'2 6
As discussed above, a two-way communication is one in which the
two parties are communicating simultaneously such that any misunderstandings between them can be cleared up immediately.127 This is
simply not the case with e-mail since when the sender dispatches a
message, the recipient is not positioned at a computer awaiting the
receipt of the message.128 Thus, the recipient has no way of signaling
to the sender that the transmission was not received or was garbled,
should that be the case. As Baum and Perritt, Jr. have stated:
There is... a certain noninstantaneous characteristic of computerized offers and acceptances ....

Telephonic and teletype communica-

tions are addressed to humans, who hear or read them and form some
conscious understanding of their meaning. The need for human
interpretation ensures awareness of contents, one of the main concerns
of offer and acceptance.
...[E-mail messages] may be more like telegraph messages or
letters, which differ from telephonic or face-to-face communications
primarily because ofthe possibility of an error in the message transmis29
sion that is not detected immediately through party interaction.1
But the inquiry does not end here, as there exists a substitute for the
two-way quality of a method of communication. Since the purpose of the
two-way requirement is to provide for assurance of receipt, if receipt can
be ensured in another manner, as with an accurate computer acknowledgment, than the requirement that a communication be two-way can be
discarded. 3° In this vein, it may be argued that because a "receipt"
may be requested upon sending an e-mail message,' the offeree does
indeed have the ability to ensure receipt of the message, and thus the
two-way prong of the Restatement test is effectively satisfied.1 12 This
theory is problematic in that a "receipt" can be misleading in the context
of Internet e-mail. When a user receives a receipt for an intrasystem
message, this does indeed indicate that the recipient acknowledged the

126.

See supra text accompanying note 1.

127. See supra text accompanying note 48.
128. Compare this to "chatting" in a forum, which is two-way. See supra note 58.
129. BAUM & PERRTr, JR, supra note 48, at 324.

130. See supra text accompanying note 54.
131. This function is very typical of e-mail systems. It simply provides that a message of
acknowledgment automatically be sent to the sender when the original message is "received" by the
recipient. As discussed in this Part, "receipt" is an elusive term.

132. This theory has been advanced in the context of EDI. See supra text accompanying note
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message and either read or deleted it.133 But when a user receives a
receipt for a message sent out over the Internet, this indicates only that
the Internet received it, not that it reached its destination." So even
after a receipt is received, the sender remains uncertain as to the state of
the message because it may have gone astray after reaching the Internet.
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Internet e-mail is a very
viable modem medium of communication, and that it does not warrant
similar treatment as face-to-face communication with respect to the
effective time of an acceptance because it is neither substantially instantaneous nor two-way. Rather, acceptances transmitted via Internet e-mail
should be treated in the same manner as postal acceptances. While this
Note gives no opinion on the longstanding controversy of the merits of
the mailbox rule-curious readers are free to examine the exhaustive
literature on the subject 135 and to draw their own conclusions--the fact
remains that American courts have unanimously applied the rule in the
context of the post since its creation in 1818. Thus, it is likely that they
will apply the rule in the context of Internet e-mail as well.
Further, even if the thrust of this Note is disregarded, and Internet
e-mail is considered better analogized to face-to-face communication than
to correspondence by post, it is likely that the mailbox rule will nevertheless be applied to acceptances transmitted via Internet e-mail in a
majority of American courts, which have seemingly ignored the emerging
trend to abolish the mailbox rule in the context of substantially instantaneous two-way methods of communication, treating telephoned and
telexed acceptances as effective where and when dispatched.
PaulFasciano*

133. See, e.g., E-mail from Ryan Robbins, Customer Service Representative, Compuserve (Jan.

17, 1996) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
134. See, e.g., E-mail from Trish Mayhom, Customer Service Representative, Compuserve (Nov.
19, 1996) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). For an example of how this receipt feature has
been misunderstood, see Deluca, supra note 78, at 23.
135. See sources cited supra note 23.
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